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After fifteen years, Smith v. Van Gorkom remains intellectually frus-
trating. The annoyance stems from the fact that, while the decision may
have dramatically improved the quality of deliberations in corporate board-
rooms, the imposition of liability on the defendants in the case seems pro-
foundly unjust.
When Smith v. Van Gorkom was decided, the mergers and acquisitions
("M&A") industry was in its infancy. The Trans Union board made its de-
cision in 1980. At that time, when making a decision about a control
transaction, industry practice called for directors to evaluate three things:
premium to market, price to book, and price/earnings ratio. That was the guts
of what was done, and all the firms created the database from scratch. There
weren't EBITDA multiples or detailed DCF analysis. There were occasionally
some industry comparables... but M&A valuation was rather unsophisticated
by current standards.'
By today's standards, the board's procedures seem woefully inade-
quate. There was no modem third-party valuation analysis of any kind. No
investment bankers were hired. The analysis that was done by management
was not thorough. The board did not read the merger agreement, much less
discuss and deliberate its contents in any detail.2
But although the board's decision was not cloaked in the same elabo-
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rate procedural framework that has become the norm in modem boardrooms
when directors are considering actions that involve organic changes to the
corporate structure, this alone does not mean it was a bad decision from the
economic perspective of the shareholders, 3 or even that it was legally in-
adequate. 4 On the directors' side of the ledger, of course, is the fact that the
board of directors was acting in good faith, and in a manner it thought was
in the best interests of the firm's shareholders.
The board's decision was not tainted by even a hint of self-dealing or
conflict of interest. There has never been a serious argument that Smith v.
Van Gorkom was a duty of loyalty case in disguise. These directors were
not inept, lazy, or corrupt. In addition, the board of Trans Union consisted
of a group of men with a vast wealth of experience. The five inside direc-
tors had been with the company an average of 23.2 years each, and had an
average of 13.6 years of experience as corporate directors. 5 The outside di-
rectors included Alan Wallis, the highly respected dean of the University of
Chicago Business School, and four chief executive officers of Chicago-
based companies. These distinguished directors brought their expertise and
experience to bear on the decision about whether to approve the merger.
For the Delaware Supreme Court to fail to respect their decision seems fun-
damentally inconsistent with the basic principles of the business judgment
rule. This inconsistency, combined with the harsh tone of the decision and
the debilitating threat of financial ruin from the personal liability to which
the directors were exposed, are what make the decision such a profoundly
frustrating intellectual challenge for corporate law scholars.
This Article explores three under-analyzed aspects of the decision.
First, it examines the relationship between Jerome Van Gorkom, the Trans
Union CEO, and the rest of the Trans Union board. Part I argues that a par-
ticularly odd aspect of the case is the way the entire board was punished for
Mr. Van Gorkom's failure to follow adequate procedures and inform the
board fully about certain critical aspects of the transaction.
Part II explains that the case is less frustrating once we realize that
Delaware law, like corporate law generally, provides a set of one-size-fits-
all, "cookie cutter" rules that apply to all corporations. This means the
same set of rules that apply to honest upstanding boards like Trans Union
also must be made to work for the small but troubling set of corporations
with pathological boards whose directors are inept, lazy, corrupt, or some
combination of the three.
Part III discusses Smith v. Van Gorkom in the context of the jurisdic-
tional competition for corporate charters. Here I argue that far from hurting
3 See Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van Gorkom Still
Rankles, Probably, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 631 (2002).
4 Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41
Bus. LAw. 1187 (1986).
5 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 894 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
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Delaware in the intense competition for the chartering business of major
corporations, the decision likely helped Delaware because it provided di-
rect, tangible, and sustainable benefits to the lawyers and investment bank-
ers who advise corporations on business-chartering decisions.
Part IV concludes, reconciling these observations by showing that they
all support the interest group theory of the legal rules that govern the behav-
ior of Delaware chartered corporations. Delaware has market power in the
jurisdictional competition for corporate charters because it enjoys a "first-
mover" advantage in this competition. This market power provides the op-
portunity for Delaware to charge more to businesses incorporating there
than would be possible in an environment of perfect competition. These
fees, however, do not go only, or even primarily, into the state's coffers.
Rather, Delaware's market power manifests itself in the form of legal rules
that increase the demand for the services of law firms and investment bank-
ers by firms incorporated in Delaware. In turn, these groups help keep
Delaware in its dominant position in the jurisdictional competition for char-
ters by continuing to recommend that companies incorporate there.
I. THE REAL CULPRIT?
One aspect of the Smith v. Van Gorkom case that has gone unexplored
is the curious relationship between Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Trans Union's
chairman and chief executive officer, and the rest of the Trans Union board.
This Part advances the hypothesis that a more plausible justification for the
court's decision was the board's inappropriate reliance on Van Gorkom's
judgment and negotiating. From this point of view, the board's failure was
not, as is generally supposed, entirely a failure of process. Rather, the
board's failures were: (a) that it did not seem to realize that Van Gorkom
was not a representative shareholder; (b) that it delegated too much power
to Van Gorkom in his negotiations with the acquirer; and (c) that it did not
properly monitor Van Gorkom's negotiations with the acquirer.
From this perspective, the board perhaps deserves some blame, but the
lion's share of the blame for any harm imposed on shareholders by the
Trans Union-Pritzker merger falls on the shoulders of Van Gorkom, rather
than the Trans Union board.
A. Van Gorkom's Interest in Selling
Jerome Van Gorkom owned a substantial block of stock in his com-
pany, and was "made a multimillionaire when his Trans Union stock hold-
ings were cashed out at the merger.",6 In addition, the Delaware Supreme
Court found it "noteworthy" that Van Gorkom was "approaching 65 years
of age and mandatory retirement" at the time of the challenged transaction.7
6 William M. Owen, A CEO Named Van Gorkom, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 35,35 (2000).
7 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866.
96:607 (2002)
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Presumably, this was "noteworthy" because Van Gorkom may have had an
interest in liquidating his shares.
By contrast, many, if not most, Trans Union shareholders were in a
much different position. Trans Union had been in an acquisition mode for
some time prior to its acquisition by the Pritzker group. Specifically, the
company had made at least 42 acquisitions, ranging in size from $36,000 to
$24 million.8 These transactions, unlike the transaction challenged in Smith
v. Van Gorkom, generally were structured in the form of stock exchanges,
in which Trans Union offered its own stock to the shareholders of the target
firm in exchange for their shares. These exchange transactions were not
taxable events from the standpoint of the target firm shareholders. Fully
one-third of Trans Union's shareholders had acquired their Trans Union
shares in this way: 4.3 million shares of Trans Union's 12.5 million out-
standing shares had been distributed in the context of acquisition ex-
changes. 9
Thus, many Trans Union shareholders, including B. Alden Smith, the
named plaintiff in the case, were Trans Union shareholders by virtue of
their first being shareholders in firms that Trans Union acquired. These
shareholders had paid low prices for the stock of the small companies that
were subsequently acquired by Trans Union. This meant, of course, that
their tax basis at the time of the deal between Trans Union and Pritzker was
very low. The transaction with Pritzker would result in substantial and un-
avoidable tax liability for these shareholders. Mr. Smith was bitterly op-
posed to the merger for that reason.
Despite Van Gorkom's considerable equity stake in the company,' 0
then, his interest in hurriedly consummating an all-cash transaction with
Pritzker was not representative of the interests of other shareholders. As a
consequence, the board should have been unwilling to grant Van Gorkom's
view about the advisability of the merger as much respect as it otherwise
might. This point is underscored by the fact that Donald Romans, Trans
Union's chief financial officer, specifically had "suggested that considera-
tion should be given to the adverse tax consequences of an all-cash deal for
low-basis shareholders."" There is no evidence that this suggestion was
ever followed.
Strikingly, it appears that the most important aspect of the transaction,
the price Trans Union shareholders were to receive, was determined not on
the basis of what the company was worth, but rather, on the basis of the
price that Van Gorkom wanted to receive for the shares he owned. 12 Be-
8 William M. Owen, A Shareholder Named Smith, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDs 39, 39 (2000).
9 Id.
10 Mr. Van Gorkom owned 75,000 shares. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865.
" Id. at 867.
12 At a meeting on September 5, 1980 with Senior Management of Trans Union at which the issue
ofa leveraged buy out of the company was discussed, there was no effort to determine the fair or appro-
610
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cause Van Gorkom was not representative of the shareholding population as
a whole, merely accepting the price he thought was adequate was inappro-
priate. Moreover, basic economic theory posits that supply curves slope up
and demand curves slope down. The aggregated preferences of all purchas-
ers and potential purchasers form the supply curve for a particular security,
while the aggregated preferences of all sellers and potential sellers for a se-
curity combine to form the demand curve.13 Van Gorkom's private, subjec-
tive opinion about the price he would be willing to accept for his shares
forms but one point on the supply curve for Trans Union's shares. Other
shareholders, with different views about the company's prospects, different
tax burdens, different patterns of consumption and investment reflecting
different stages in the life cycle, and different needs, would necessarily
have different views about the price at which the company should be sold.
It made no sense to let Van Gorkom's views govern.
Another reason the board likely was wrong to grant deference to Mr.
Van Gorkom's view was the unusually high degree of dissension within the
Trans Union management group. Apparently, a number of Trans Union of-
ficers wanted to arrange a leveraged buyout by management as a means of
transferring control of the company, but Van Gorkom rejected this out of
hand. There were strong reasons to believe a leveraged buyout would have
been an appropriate mechanism for recapitalizing Trans Union and for ef-
fectuating a value-enhancing change of control. But again, Van Gorkom's
private views controlled: he simply decided he didn't want to sell the com-
pany to management, regardless of whether the management group valued
the company more highly than other potential purchasers. Perhaps this was
because Van Gorkom was philosophically opposed to management buy-
outs.' 4 Perhaps Van Gorkom objected because he was to have been left out
of the management group that would have been bidding for the company.
5
Trans Union generated a significant amount of stable cash flow.16 This
made the company an ideal candidate for a leveraged buyout because the
steady cash flow would enable the company to support the debt service
payments associated with its post buy out, highly leveraged capital struc-
ture. It is not clear why Van Gorkom was so adamantly opposed to the idea
of a leveraged buyout. At one point, Van Gorkom claimed he opposed a
leveraged buy out for Trans Union because such a transaction would in-
priate level for the firm's stock. But when various prices were discussed, Van Gorkom stated that "he
would be willing to take $55 per share for his 75,000 shares." Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865.
13 See PAULA. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 48-64 (14th ed. 1992).
14 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865 (noting that Van Gorkom opposed management buy out as "in-
volving a potential conflict of interest for management").
15 WILLIAM M. OWEN, AUTOPSY OF A MERGER 142 (1986) ('The list [of Trans Union managers
who would be invited to participate in the leveraged buyout] did not contain the names of either Van
Gorkom or [Bruce S.] Chelberg [President of Trans Union]. Neither Van Gorkom nor Chelberg had
been asked to participate. There would be no role for them in the new company.").
16 Id. at 24.
96:607 (2002)
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volve a conflict of interest. 17 But this seems implausible in this situation
because nobody on the Trans Union board, including Van Gorkom, was to
be a participant in the buyout.
Leveraged buyouts by management can involve conflicts of interest.
On the one hand, since management has organized the purchasing group,
management has an incentive to buy the company at the lowest possible
price. On the other hand, management owes fiduciary duties to sharehold-
ers to obtain the highest possible prices for their shares in any control trans-
action. A management group interested in a leveraged buy out might not
pursue other bidders, and even might be tempted actively to discourage
them. Management also might try to get the board and the shareholders to
accept a "low ball" offer for the firm.
There are ways of mitigating these conflicts of interest to protect the
shareholders. In particular, an independent board of directors can intercede
to negotiate against management on behalf of the shareholders. Similarly,
the board can retain a disinterested and unaffiliated person to negotiate on
behalf of the public shareholders. Moreover, the usual conflict between
management and shareholders inherent in leveraged buy outs did not really
exist in the case of Trans Union because, as mentioned above, Van Gorkom
was nearing retirement and would not be participating in any buy out of the
company. Consequently, his interests were not compromised by his status
as an officer.
Moreover, the real conflict of interest appears to have manifested itself
in Van Gorkom's behavior, rather than in the behavior of the management
who might have participated in a leveraged buyout. It appears that Ro-
mans's proposal to do a leveraged buy out was what put "the idea of being
acquired on the table" and prompted Van Gorkom "to test the waters" to de-
termine whether the company should be sold.18 Although it was "widely
assumed" that Pritzker sought out Trans Union as a target, in fact, the oppo-
site was true. Van Gorkom not only initiated merger discussions with
Pritzker, but he did so without informing any of his senior management.19
The best analysis of Van Gorkom's motives for pursuing a sale of the
company to Pritzker was that
[b]ecause Mr. Van Gorkom... is approaching retirement, insiders suspect he
would rather sell out than ... take on the challenge of restructuring the com-
pany or prematurely turning the gavel over to somebody else. That leads in-
siders to speculate that Mr. Van Gorkom acted impulsively and without
consulting either his managers or his outside advisers. Trans Union's execu-
tive suite continues to be rocked by dissent, with most of the management
17 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865.
18 OWEN, supra note 15, at 39.
19 Id. at 80.
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team alienated from Mr. Van Gorkom.
20
In other words, it appears as though Mr. Van Gorkom acted autocratically
and self-interestedly in the way he approached this transaction. He also ap-
pears to have provided limited opportunities for his fellow directors and
managers to become involved either in negotiating the transaction or in dis-
cussing its merits.
B. Van Gorkom's Attempt to Wrest Control of Trans Union from the Board
An elemental principle of Delaware corporate law is that the business
and affairs of the corporation are to be run by or under the direction of the
board of directors. 21 Van Gorkom ignored this fundamental tenet of corpo-
rate law by unilaterally negotiating the sale of Trans Union without the in-
volvement of his board.
The negotiation of a merger represents the soft underbelly of American
corporate governance. On the one hand, it seems logical that negotiations
should be transparent to prevent management from negotiating such oner-
ous terms that the transaction falls through. On the other hand, the transac-
tion must remain confidential to protect its integrity. If news of the
transaction leaks out, the bidder is subject to exploitation by free-riding ri-
val bidders. Even in the absence of such rival bidders, leaks of information
about the pendency of the bid inevitably will cause the target firm's share
price to rise, thus reducing the desirability of the deal from the bidder's per-
spective.
This problem is not easy to resolve. The mere fact that the target firm
board is aware of the negotiations with a potential acquirer is not sufficient
to protect the integrity of the negotiating process. Target firm managers in-
tent on undermining a transaction can do so in many subtle ways during the
negotiations if they are not carefully monitored. These negotiations may
never be disclosed because they will be deemed immaterial and, therefore,
not subject to disclosure if there is no realistic chance that they would result
in a change in control. Similarly, where the CEO is intent on selling the
company to a particular bidder in a hurried fashion, it will often be difficult
for the board to monitor the negotiations from afar to insure the company's
interests are being protected.
But here it appears the board was entirely shut out. According to an
insider's account, Van Gorkom signed the merger agreement on the evening
of Saturday, September 30, 1980, during a black-tie party for the Chicago
Lyric Opera hosted by Trans Union Corporation at its headquarters. The
agreement was signed without the Trans Union board having read it:
As the festivities continued, Van Gorkom quietly stepped out. Garbed in
his formal black suit with tails and a white bow tie, he dropped down to the
20 Herbert Greenberg, Behind the Turmoil at Trans Union, CRAIN'S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 12, 1981, at 1.
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
96:607 (2002)
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floor below carrying a tray laden with drinks. There, a group of lawyers-the
beneficiaries of his thoughtfulness-was working diligently putting the finish-
ing touches on agreements that provided for a $688 million merger of Trans
Union with the Pritzker interests. It was a deal so cloaked in secrecy that, with
two exceptions, none of the members of Trans Union's top management or
board of directors had any inkling of what was afoot until that very day.
22
In other words, Van Gorkom did not permit the Trans Union board to carry
out its responsibility to monitor management's negotiations with the acquir-
ing firm because he did not inform them that such negotiations were being
conducted. The opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
Gorkom does not make clear how the board could have fulfilled its fiduci-
ary responsibilities in light of the fact that the CEO, Van Gorkom, pre-
sented it with afait accompli in the form of a prepackaged, apparently fully
negotiated, merger document.
To understand the board's position, one must understand the sequence
of events. On September 18, 1980, Van Gorkom met with Jay Pritzker and
persuaded Pritzker to make an offer to purchase one hundred percent of
Trans Union's shares for fifty-five dollars per share. From there it appears
that Pritzker dominated the negotiations. Pritzker "insisted that the Trans
Union Board act on his merger proposal within the next three days, stating
to Van Gorkom: 'We have to have a decision by no later than Sunday
(evening, September 21). ''123 The board did not convene until noon on Sep-
tember 20, only one day before the expiration of Pritzker's offer.24
The time pressure on the board was tremendous. Adding to the pres-
sure, the lawyer Van Gorkom had retained to advise Trans Union on the
merger told the board members not only that no fairness opinion was re-
quired, but also that they "might be sued" if they failed to accept the offer.25
Van Gorkom placed pressure on the board. He maneuvered the board into a
position from which it was virtually impossible to exercise its fiduciary
duty of care.
The court in Smith v. Van Gorkom grounded its decision on its finding
that "Trans Union's Board was grossly negligent in that it failed to act with
informed reasonable deliberation in agreeing to the Pritzker merger pro-
posal on September 20.,,26 However, a better explanation is that the board
was found liable because it put too much trust in the company's CEO who
was defending the merger, perhaps for personal reasons, and whose inter-
ests were not well aligned with those of the shareholders. At one point, the
dissent recognizes this, observing that "[t]he majority has spoken and has
effectively said that Trans Union's Directors have been the victims of a
22 OWEN, supra note 15, at 2.
23 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867 (Del. 1985).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 868.
26 Id. at 88 1.
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'fast shuffle' by Van Gorkom and Pritzker."
27
This aspect of the case provides a highly relevant lesson for boards to-
day because it suggests that the appropriate relationship between managers
and boards of directors is more adversarial than most lawyers believe is ap-
propriate. The Trans Union board suffered from allowing itself to develop
a very cozy relationship with management. This is exactly the trap that ap-
pears to have snared the Enron Corporation board of directors. Like the
Trans Union board, the Enron board was too trusting of management, par-
ticularly where management was acting self-interestedly.
Moreover, it appears that the Trans Union board was given erroneous
information that tended to increase its inclination to accept the Pritzker bid.
First, it appears the board was under the mistaken impression that the fifty-
five dollars per share sales price for the company had initially been sug-
gested to Van Gorkom by Pritzker, when in fact it was Van Gorkom who
suggested the price.28 Worse, it appears Van Gorkom failed to disclose, and
may ultimately even have sabotaged, the only competing proposal for Trans
Union. This proposal, procured through the efforts of senior management
unhappy with the Pritzker offer (particularly Trans Union CFO Donald
Romans), was submitted by the investment firm Kolberg, Kravis, Roberts &
Co. ("KKR"). 29 Henry Kravis and Donald Romans delivered by hand a
formal written offer to purchase all of Trans Union's Assets for sixty dol-
lars per share, although the offer was contingent on KKR's ability to pro-
cure a relatively modest amount of additional financing.30 The KKR bid
was superior in price to the Pritzker bid, but it had the drawback of includ-
ing senior management-but not Van Gorkom-in the purchasing group.
The KKR offer was in the form of a letter addressed to the Trans Un-
ion board of directors. The letter requested that Kravis be allowed to make
his offer in person at the board meeting scheduled for the afternoon of De-
cember 2, the same day the offer was delivered to Van Gorkom.
3
1
Van Gorkom's reaction to this superior offer was "completely nega-
tive," even though the offer Van Gorkom negotiated with Pritzker had con-
tained the same financing condition.32 Van Gorkom refused to announce
publicly the KKR bid on the spurious grounds that the offer might "chill"
any other offer.33 This refusal was inconsistent and wrong. It was inconsis-
tent with Van Gorkom's endorsement of a press release following the Pritz-
27 Id. at 894.
28 Id. at 868.
29 Id. at 884.
30 KKR had obtained all but $130 million of the $650 million in financing that would be required to
complete the transaction, and stated that it was "confident" that commitments for the rest could be ob-
tained in less than a month's time. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 885.
96:607 (2002)
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ker proposal, and it was wrong because such a press release would likely
encourage, rather than discourage, competing offers. Van Gorkom himself
recognized this.34
Worse, it appears Van Gorkom may have worked to cause KKR to
withdraw its offer prior to the board meeting at which it was to have been
presented. KKR was known for making offers only with the encourage-
ment of incumbent management, 35 and incumbent management participa-
tion was an integral part of its bid for Trans Union. After learning of the
KKR bid, Van Gorkom conferred with Jack R. Kruizenga, the president of
Trans Union's most important subsidiary, the Union Tank Car Group (de-
scribed by the court as the "rail car leasing operation").3 6 Kniizenga then
made what the court described as a "sudden decision" to withdraw from the
KKR purchasing group.37 Later, as the dark clouds of litigation began to
close around Van Gorkom, he denied responsibility for Kruizenga's deci-
sion to withdraw from what would have been a very challenging and lucra-
tive position. But the undisputed fact is that Kruizenga's decision to
withdraw from the KKR purchasing group caused Kravis to withdraw his
offer. KKR's withdrawal
was in line with KKR's position that it does deals only on a friendly basis. In
view of the reception that had been accorded the KKR offer and the split that
now existed in Trans Union's management, it was clear that what had begun as
a friendly deal had almost instantaneously been transformed into a rather acri-
monious one. It also was clear that Van Gorkom was perturbed that Romans
and [Sidney H.] Bonser [head of Trans Union's rail car leasing group] were
part of the buyout proposal. Perhaps more importantly, Kruizenga, one of the
company's most key employees, now had decided not to participate but instead
to strongly oppose the deal. Under those circumstances, KKR did not wish to
proceed.3
Stunningly, Van Gorkom did not inform the Trans Union board about the
KKR offer on the grounds that, by the time the meeting had convened, the
offer had been withdrawn. This is an outrageous failure of disclosure on
Van Gorkom's part because Kruizenga might well have joined the man-
agement group participating in KKR's bid if he had thought the bid had the
board's approval.
Evidence from behavioral psychology indicates that the mere fact that
KKR was prepared to make a superior competing bid, regardless of whether
the Trans Union board was aware of the rival bid when it agreed to the
34 Id. at 885 n.27 (noting that at the time of the press release announcing the Pritzker bid, "Van
Gorkom had then justified a press release as encouraging rather than chilling later offers").
35 OWEN, supra note 15, at 9 ("KKR considered management participation an essential ingredient of
its buyout formula, providing tremendous motivation and impetus for a successful venture.").
36 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885.
37 id.
38 OWEN, supra note 15, at 149.
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merger with Pritzker, might well lead to the conclusion that the bid ac-
cepted by management was inadequate. This is because the damages to the
Trans Union shareholders from the acceptance of the Pritzker offer de-
pended on whether there would be a subsequent superior bid for the com-
pany, and on the probability of such a subsequent bid actually occurring.3 9
Observing that there actually was a superior bid for Trans Union, even if
the bid was withdrawn, could have distorted the views of the judges about
the abstract issue of whether it was likely that a genuine superior bid subse-
quently would have materialized if the Pritzker bid were turned down. Like
other people, judges are susceptible to cognitive biases. For example, evi-
dence from behavioral psychology indicates that one way that people's de-
cision-making capabilities can be distorted relates to perceptions of risk. 40
People's perceptions of risk are influenced by their ability to recall exam-
ples of the risk being realized.41 Applying this basic insight to Van Gorkom
is straightforward: the fact that there actually was a superior subsequent bid
for Trans Union naturally would cause the judges evaluating the directors'
decisions to overestimate the actual probability that such a bid would occur
at the time the directors were making their decision.
Put another way, the perception of a risk of harm will increase if the
harm actually occurs.4 2 From the perspective of the Delaware Supreme
Court, the relevant risk, which was the risk of a subsequent superior bid, ac-
tually did occur. This, in turn, caused the judges to think the risk of this
event was higher than it really was, and may have contributed to the judges'
intense skepticism about the validity of the Trans Union board's decision-
making process.
C. The Board's Monitoring of Van Gorkom "s Negotiations with Pritzker
The above discussion raises the possibility that the lion's share of the
blame for wrongdoing lay not with the Trans Union board, but with the way
Van Gorkom managed the negotiating process. He gave the impression that
the fifty-five dollars per share offer was instigated by Pritzker, when it was
not. He negotiated unilaterally with Pritzker without informing his board.
He waited until the last possible minute before calling the board meeting to
approve the merger. He actively discouraged competing bids. At the Sep-
tember 20, 1980 board meeting at which the original merger agreement was
approved, the only members of senior management allowed to attend were
Chelberg and Petersen. Not coincidentally, Chelberg and Petersen were the
39 This is the point of Professor MeChesney's Article for this symposium. See McChesney, supra
note 3.
40 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS
TO CONFLICT RESOLUrION 44 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
41 Id.
42 Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683
(1999).
96:607 (2002)
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only members of senior management who supported the proposal.43
It seems reasonable to surmise, under these facts, that the Trans Union
board would have been in a position to negotiate a better price with Pritzker
had it known all of the relevant facts. If the board had been fully informed
by Van Gorkom, it would have known it was in a stronger bargaining posi-
tion, and would have been justified in taking a stronger bargaining position
with Pritzker.
The board in Trans Union has been faulted for failing to adequately
consider the Pritzker bid. But an equally plausible interpretation of the
facts is that the Trans Union CEO should have been faulted for not giving
the board an adequate framework from which it could consider the bid. In
particular, if the board had known of the KKR bid, it would have been able
to negotiate more effectively with Pritzker, thereby relieving itself of liabil-
ity.
Of course, putting most of the blame on Van Gorkom does not absolve
the directors of blame. For example, the directors knew when they ap-
proved the transaction that there was no fairness opinion from investment
bankers. They knew that there were no investment bankers or other outside
valuation experts at the meeting where the merger was discussed. The di-
rectors also knew they had not been furnished copies of the merger agree-
ment, and certainly they knew they had not read the merger agreement
before approving it.
The board based its initial decision to approve the merger offer "pri-
marily on Van Gorkom's representations." 44 However, it seems clear that
the highly experienced Trans Union board would not have failed to delve
more deeply into the particulars of this merger if it had been fully informed
by Van Gorkom (a) of the existence of a rival bid for the company; (b) of
the fact that Van Gorkom, and not Pritzker, had suggested the transaction
and the price; (c) that senior management was opposed to the deal; (d) that
the price was formulated to meet Van Gorkom's private views about the
sum he wanted to receive for his shares, rather than on the basis of a sound
financial estimate of the real economic worth of the firm to a bidder in an
arm's length transaction; and (e) that there had been no real negotiations
with Pritzker.
It is only against this background of the board's ignorance that its
seemingly bizarre failure even to suggest a higher price to Pritzker is com-
prehensible. This analysis reveals that the core flaw on the part of the Trans
Union board did not lie in its failure to adequately consider the Pritzker of-
fer. Rather, the board erred in placing too much trust in the company's
CEO, and especially in giving the CEO too much latitude to negotiate with
Pritzker.
43 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867 ("No member of Management, except Chelberg and Pe-
terson, supported the proposal.").
44 Id. at 874.
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The directors were unable to prevent Van Gorkom from negotiating
unilaterally with Pritzker, because they were unaware that Van Gorkom had
begun negotiations until they were presented with a fully negotiated offer.
The fully negotiated offer, however, should have raised a red flag with the
directors; upon learning that Van Gorkom had negotiated unilaterally with
Pritzker, the directors should have wondered why Van Gorkom was trying
to assume so much control over the process.
1I. THE "ONE-SIZE FITS ALL" PROBLEM
The court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom has been criticized by the
dissent for not giving sufficient deference to the immense skill and experi-
ence of the Trans Union board.45 The dissent by Justice McNeilly spends
seven full paragraphs extolling the virtues of the board, observing along the
way that "[d]irectors of this caliber are not ordinarily taken in by a 'fast
shuffie.",46 This remark bolsters the argument in the previous Part of this
Article and reveals a vast gulf between the ways the majority and minority
opinions perceived this case. The majority viewed the legal problem as the
failure of the Trans Union board to follow the procedural steps necessary to
insure that their decision to approve the merger was the product of an in-
formed business judgment.
The minority viewed the legal question as whether the CEO of Trans
Union duped the board, and concluded that he had not. For the reasons de-
veloped in the preceding Part, the minority is demonstrably wrong. In par-
ticular, if the board had known about the process by which the purchase
price had been determined; the commitment by Van Gorkom to do a deal
with Pritzger to the exclusion of other bidders, particularly KKR; and Van
Gorkom's systematic and strategic rationing of the information that he sup-
plied to the board to maximize the probability that the board would reach
the result he wanted; it is likely the board would have responded very dif-
ferently to the Pritzker offer.
Nevertheless, the majority's view of the procedures that should be fol-
lowed by a board is fascinating, particularly when juxtaposed against the
impressive credentials of the board. Essentially, the dissent in Van Gorkom
poses a difficult question: why should a board with the wisdom and experi-
ence of the Trans Union board have had to submit itself to the cumbersome,
baroque procedures envisioned by the majority? The dissent makes the tell-
ing point that the directors' sophistication, experience, and intimate knowl-
edge of the company's business and prospects made it unnecessary for them
to go through a formalistic ritual when considering the Pritzker offer. Ac-
cording to Justice McNeilly, the directors
knew Trans Union like the back of their hands and were more than well quali-
45 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
46 Id.
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fled to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the affairs of
Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation. Lest we forget, the
corporate world of then and now operates on what is so aptly referred to as
"the fast track." These men were at the time an integral part of that world, all
professional business men, not intellectual figureheads.
47
The dissent was undoubtedly accurate in its factual description of the Trans
Union board. But its legal analysis is flawed, or at best incomplete. The
problem is the dissent's distinction between well-qualified directors-like
the Trans Union directors-who are competent to make decisions "at the
speed of business, ' 'a and other, less competent directors, who might need
more time to consider their actions.
Such an approach to corporate governance would be unworkable. Di-
rectors often would not know in advance whether they would later be
deemed sufficiently competent to qualify for "fast track" decision-making.
The delicate issue of determining the precise parameters of directors' exper-
tise would be even more difficult. Certain directors might be expert at ac-
counting issues, but not at mergers and acquisitions, or strategic planning,
or research and development, or human resources, to name only a few. Fur-
ther, because directors of any particular company will have a wide range of
skill and experience, the court would have to decide whether to grant defer-
ence to the skill, experience, and expertise of a board as a whole, or to di-
rectors individually. Perhaps some directors would be required to obtain
expert advice, to inform themselves of the relevant issues, and to deliberate
fully and carefully, while other, more expert directors could merely decide
on the basis of their experience and business acumen.
In other words, it appears the practical need for a uniform, "one-size-
fits-all" evaluative standard for the conduct of directors renders the contex-
tual, case-by-case approach suggested by Justice McNeilly unworkable.
Once we determine that corporate directors are obliged to use due care
when carrying out their directorial responsibilities, we cannot exempt cer-
tain directors on the grounds that their greater expertise allows them to skip
steps in the deliberative process.
This, in turn, means that the deliberative process, which inevitably will
be structured by lawyers, will necessarily be structured as a "one-size-fits-
all" cookie-cutter affair. Law firms will structure the deliberative process
the same way for all of their board clients to make sure that the clients are
not held to have failed to reach an informed decision. This analysis has
three implications that lead to a better understanding of the nature of corpo-
rate governance in the United States.
First, this one-size-fits-all, cookie-cutter approach is likely to stifle in-
novation. Once a safe harbor has been constructed, lawyers and clients will
47 Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
48 The reference here is to the Microsoft slogan, "business at the speed of thought." See
http://www.speed-of-thought.com.
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be extremely reluctant to depart from it. There are strong disincentives to
streamlining the decisional process, regardless of whether such streamlining
might result in making corporate governance more efficient.
Second, it appears that this aspect of the opinion may produce benefits
for the shareholders of the small number of pathological firms controlled by
avaricious, dishonest management and directors. Smith v. Van Gorkom
makes clear that directors and their lawyers will have to structure a careful
deliberative process at which they receive and read the appropriate docu-
ments relevant to the transaction before making any important decision.
This deliberative process is most likely to improve the decision-making
process in firms with weak corporate governance, in firs with poorly in-
formed directors, and in firms with dishonest directors, who will be threat-
ened with liability if the transaction they are approving cannot be defended.
But the elaborate procedures that now shroud the board's deliberative
process impose costs on the vast majority of firms that are under the man-
agement of competent, honest, well-meaning directors and officers. Of
course, the deliberations required by Smith v. Van Gorkom will still be effi-
cient from an economic perspective if the benefits outweigh the costs. It is
possible that large benefits from the increased deliberation in the small uni-
verse of pathological firms compensates for what may be relatively small
administrative costs imposed on a very large number of honest firms.
Finally, it is likely that the opinion in Smith v. Van Gorkom has had a
subtle yet profound effect on the composition of board of directors of U.S.
corporations. By changing the nature of the job of being a corporate direc-
tor, the opinion may have changed the sort of people who are interested in
becoming directors. The entrepreneurial, swashbuckling, seat-of-the-pants
decision-makers who feel comfortable making spontaneous decisions likely
will be uncomfortable or unhappy in the bureaucratized environment cre-
ated by Smith v. Van Gorkom. By contrast, those who enjoy operating
within the slow-moving, carefully scripted, decisional environment that the
majority in Smith v. Van Gorkom favored will find the job of corporate di-
rector more enticing than before. This "selection effect" could undermine
the entrepreneurial focus of U.S. business.
IM. VAN GORKOM AND THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FOR
CORPORATE CHARTERS
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Smith v. Van Gorkom sent
shock waves through the corporate world. The decision "reverberated
mightily through the boardrooms of Corporate America, contributing to a
huge escalation in D&O insurance rates and a reexamination by many ex-
ecutives of the personal risks of board service., 49 Of course, the court's de-
cision, which imposed significant personal liability on every member of the
49 Roundtable: The Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note 1, at 28.
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Trans Union board, was not well received in the corporate community.
Prior to the decision, it seemed simply unthinkable that these honest,
hard-working, experienced executives, all of whom were acting in good
faith and with the best interests of the shareholders in mind, could be held
grossly negligent and exposed to personal rain as the result of a garden va-
riety business decision on a merger that greatly enhanced shareholder
wealth. Judge Marvel's decision for the Court of Chancery upholding the
actions of the directors was unequivocal.50 Relying on the "market value of
Trans Union's stock, the business acumen of the members of the board of
Trans Union, the substantial premium over market offered by the Pritzkers
and the ultimate effect on the merger price provided by the prospect of
other bids for the stock in question," the Chancery Court concluded that the
Trans Union board "did not act recklessly or improvidently in determining a
course of action which they believed to be in the best interest of the stock-
holders of Trans Union.",
5 1
By contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion appeared to be a
sharp departure both from prior law and from prior, well-settled expecta-
tions about management's ability to rely on that court to provide a sympa-
thetic audience for corporate disputes in which their integrity or competence
is impugned.52 Because of the incredible notoriety of the case, the opinion
provides a valuable window on the nature of corporate federalism in the
United States.
In theory, of course, the United States has a federalist system of juris-
dictional competition for corporate charters.53 Under this system, states
compete with one another for chartering business. Three rival theories vie
to account for the nature of this competition.
A. Jurisdictional Competition as a Race for the Bottom
The oldest theory is the "race-to-the-bottom" concept that portrays the
state of Delaware as a deplorable "competition in laxity' '54 in which Dela-
ware panders to corporate managers to attract the fees associated with their
incorporation business.55 According to this theory, which has such notable
50 The decision of the Chancery Court, Smith v. Pritzker, CA 6432, July 6, 1982 (Marvel, J.), was
not published, but it is available as Appendix II in Autopsy of a Merger, William M. Owen's book about
the transaction, OWEN, supra note 15, at 268.
51 Id. at 274.
52 See Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 129
(1988).
53 Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces ofthe Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225, 265-73 (1985).
54 The term "competition in laxity" is meant to evoke Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933), in which he characterized the competition among the states
for chartering revenues as a competition "not of diligence but of laxity."
55 William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
666 (1974).
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exponents as William Cary, former Chair of the Securities and Exchange
Commission; Ralph Nader, US Presidential candidate in 2000; and Joel
Seligman, well-known scholar and law school dean; the jurisdictional com-
petition for corporate charters exploits shareholders and panders to man-
agement interests to gain chartering business.
56
Commentators who support the "race-to-the-bottom" theory believe
that corruption and the quest for franchising fees at the state level has
caused a steady deterioration in the quality of corporate law. The premise
of the theory is that management, not shareholders or other groups, are the
key decision-makers within companies regarding the decision about where
such companies should locate themselves for jurisdictional purposes.
Smith v. Van Gorkom provides an opportunity to test the race-to-the-
bottom theory. The case provides a useful opportunity to test the race-to-
the-bottom theory because, regardless of the way one interprets the deci-
sion, the outcome is not consistent with the race-to-the-bottom theory. As
every perspective on the result in Smith v. Van Gorkom recognizes, the
court reaches a result that is antagonistic to management's interests. In par-
ticular, most commentators take the view that the opinion undermines the
traditional respect afforded to management under the business judgment
rule. If this reading of the decision is correct, it is flatly inconsistent with
the race-to-the-bottom theory.
An alternative interpretation is that the opinion deserves praise because
directors should be required to monitor management more assiduously than
they traditionally have done.58 This interpretation is also inconsistent with
the race-to-the-bottom theory, however, because it presumes that the court
thinks that Delaware managers would act irresponsibly if not closely
guarded by directors, and that these directors in turn must carefully monitor
the managers to fulfill their fiduciary duties to shareholders.
A large group of thoughtful commentators has taken the position that
the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom is about board procedure. These
commentators posit that the opinion simply requires boards of directors to
hire expensive professionals, such as investment bankers, and lawyers.
These and other third-party advisers are retained to structure a decision-
making process that will enable the board to obtain the protections of the
56 RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN &JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976);
Cary, supra note 55; see also Richard Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the
Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976); Stanley Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAWV. 883 (1976); Gordon G. Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federalism and the
Federal Courts, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146 (summer 1977).
57 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
1437, 1455 (1985); Herzel & Katz, supra note 4.
58 Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10
DEL. J. CORP. L. 505, 543 (1985) ("Trans Union is a long-overdue judicial affirmation of the need for
better informed directors and, consequently, more responsible corporate behavior.").
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business judgment rule.59 According to this view, the opinion creates only
the appearance and not the reality of an informed decision-making proc-
ess. 60 Board meetings in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom become care-
fully scripted plays whose primary purpose is to create a record in
anticipation of litigation, rather than to improve the deliberative process.
Clearly this approach cannot be reconciled with the race-to-the-bottom the-
ory's managerialist perspective because, under this view, the decision shifts
authority away from managers and into the hands of lawyers and invest-
ment bankers.
B. Jurisdictional Competition as a Race to the Top: Corporate Federalism
The principal alternative to the race-to-the-bottom theory is espoused
by commentators who extol the virtues of federalism in the form of states'
rights to promulgate the basic rules of corporate law in the United States.
This view is espoused by market-oriented judges and scholars who are
closely identified with the law and economics movement, including Frank
Easterbrook,6 1 Roberta Romano, 62 and Ralph Winter.63  These commenta-
tors argue that a variety of competitive factors, particularly competition in
the capital markets, induce states such as Delaware to enact laws that bene-
fit and protect shareholders:
It is not in the interest of Delaware corporate management or the Delaware
treasury for corporations chartered there to be at a disadvantage in raising debt
or equity capital relative to corporations chartered in other states. Manage-
ment must induce investors freely to choose [to buy] their firm's stock instead
of, among other things, stock in companies incorporated in other states or other
countries.64
The corporate federalists take the view that competition forces corporations
to incorporate in the state providing the most efficient menu of legal rules.
Because the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom imposed costs on Dela-
ware firms, it is inconsistent with the corporate federalist theory of Dela-
ware corporate law. The decision may have imposed significant costs on
shareholders in Delaware corporations. As Daniel Fischel has argued:
Shareholders are the biggest losers after Trans Union. Firms will have no dif-
59 See Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 103-09 (1989); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in
the Boardroom Afler Van Gorkom, 41 BUs. LAW. 1, 8-14 (1985).
60 Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
649, 682 (1995).
61 Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 33-35
(1983).
62 Romano, supra note 53.
63 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251, 290 (1977).
64 Id. at 257.
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ficulty finding an "expert" who is willing to state that a price at a significant
premium over the market price in an arm's-length transaction is "fair" ....
But the cost of obtaining such an opinion is, in effect, a judicially imposed tax
on corporate changes. The inevitable consequence will be that fewer transac-
tions will occur and that when they do occur, returns to investors will be
lower.
65
Thus, the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom is inconsistent with the
corporate federalism theory because it enhances the ability of managers to
resist hostile takeovers. As I have explained elsewhere in joint work with
Geoffrey Miller:
As a result of the decision, incumbent managers must delay their response to
"hot" suitors who come forward with a merger proposal and insist on an im-
mediate answer. Because of the increased duty of care and potential personal
liability, managers are required to consult outside investment counsel about the
fairness of the offer. This requirement can work to the manager's advantage:
they are free to find a cooperative banker willing to supply an opinion that the
offer is inadequate. They also have the advantage of a breathing spell in which
to marshal antitakeover defenses. Trans Union thus provides incumbents with
a powerful weapon against rush offers by unfriendly acquirers.
66
C. The Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law
The third theory to explain the primacy of Delaware corporate law is
the interest group hypothesis espoused by Macey and Miller. According
to this theory, jurisdictional competition for corporate charters is highly im-
perfect. Far from resembling textbook competition among rival firms, the
jurisdictional competition for corporate charters is highly oligopolistic.
One competitor, Delaware, dominates the competition. As a result of the
dominance, Delaware is able to charge "rents" to powerful special interest
groups.
Consistent with this theory, rather than benefiting managers (as the
race-to-the-bottom theory would predict), or shareholders (as the corporate
federalist theory would predict), the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom bene-
fits the powerful interest groups of lawyers and investment bankers who
specialize in providing legal and investment banking services to Delaware
companies. The opinion shifts power from corporate managers to lawyers
and investment bankers. Smith v. Van Gorkom is unusually well known
among corporate managers. As prominent corporate lawyer Ira Millstein
has observed, "I have never been in a board room where I couldn't get a di-
rector's attention by saying: 'Remember Van Gorkom."' 68 These discrete
65 Fischel, supra note 57, at 1453.
66 Jonathan P_ Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corpo-
rate Law, 65 Tax. L. REv. 469, 519 (1987).
67 Id.
68 Roundtable: he Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note 1, at 34.
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interest groups enjoy a highly lucrative, mutually beneficial, and symbiotic
relationship with Delaware firms. Specifically, these experts recommend
Delaware as the place for relocating firms to move. This, in turn, creates
both chartering business that benefits Delaware, and advisory business for
lawyers and investment bankers.
To summarize, one universally acknowledged ramification of Smith v.
Van Gorkom is an increase in demand for the services of lawyers and in-
vestment bankers who advise Delaware corporations. The decision tells
managers that they can insulate their decisions from subsequent attack, but
only if they hire investment bankers and Delaware counsel to structure the
appropriate procedural framework for the decisional process. From an eco-
nomic perspective, this result is the functional equivalent of imposing a
transaction tax on major corporate decisions in Delaware, with the proceeds
from the tax being paid to lawyers and investment bankers. These lawyers
and investment bankers find this result beneficial and, thus they have strong
incentives to recommend Delaware as a situs of incorporation to their cli-
ents.
Thus, consistent with the interest group theory of Delaware corporate
law, the advantages that flow from Delaware's dominant position in the ju-
risdictional competition in corporate charters accrue not to shareholders or
to managers, but to the lawyers and investment bankers who recommend
Delaware to their corporate clients as their preferred situs of incorporation.
Significantly, both the race-to-the-bottom theory and the corporate federal-
ist theory predict that Delaware should have lost ground in the jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters after the decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom. The race-to-the-bottom theory would predict that Delaware would
lose ground after the decision because that theory maintains that states must
pander to incumbent management in order to succeed in the competition for
corporate charters. Similarly, the corporate federalist theory would predict
that Smith v. Van Gorkom would cause Delaware to lose market share be-
cause of the high transaction costs of following the procedures that the
opinion requires be followed before directors can be insulated from liability
for engaging in a corporate transaction. Only the interest group theory of
Delaware corporate law predicts that the opinion would not hurt, and could
possibly help, Delaware's competitive position by providing benefits to
those critically able to steer chartering business to Delaware: lawyers and
investment bankers. And, consistent with that theory, the opinion did noth-
ing to harm Delaware's competitive position.69
69 See Romano, supra note 53 (citing statistics on Delaware's market share); Norm Veasey, Address
at the Smith v. Van Gorkom Symposium Dinner (May 18, 2001) (transcript on file with Northwestern
University Law Review) (regarding Delaware's continued dominance in the jurisdictional competition
for corporate charters); see also ROBERTA RoMAmO, THE GENius OF AMERIcAN CORPORATE LAW 6-8
(1993). Romano's data show that Delaware's revenues from incorporation continued to rise after the
opinion. The corporate franchise tax as a percentage of total taxes collected rose consistently over the
relevant years as follows:
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CONCLUSION
It is tempting simply to dub the result in Smith v. Van Gorkom a mis-
take. And leading commentators have done just that.70  But despite the
widespread attention and resounding criticism the opinion has received, the
court has never recanted or even expressed remorse for the result it reached.
In fact, the decision not only remains good law, it has been explicitly af-
firmed in other high visibility cases, such as Cede & Co. ,v. Technicolor71
and Paramount Communications v. QVC Network.72 Van Gorkom is alive
and well. It has weathered several business cycles and fifteen years of at-
tack. It will outlive its critics.
The fact that we are still analyzing and debating the decision after so
many years demonstrates why it is so much fun to practice and study corpo-
rate law. Virtually all of the intense debate about the case has involved
analysis of the decision-making process within the board in the transac-
tional context. This is an important perspective, and it is clearly the per-
spective the plaintiffs in the case wanted the Court to accept as the principal
focus.
This Article has attempted to analyze Van Gorkom from three different
perspectives. First, it analyzed the case from the perspective of the relation-
ship between the board and the company's chief executive officer. The lack
of careful deliberation by the Trans Union board is more understandable
when one understands the way the CEO commandeered the negotiations
with the acquirer and carefully rationed the information the board received.
When the relationship between the CEO and the board is examined and un-














70 Fred McChesney has remarked that, "[i]f sheer wrong-headedness of result were disqualifying,
Van Gorkom would not be worth rereading." McChesney, supra note 3, at 631. Daniel Fischel has
called the opinion "one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law." Fischel, supra note 57, at
1455.
71 634 A.2d 345, 366-367 (Del. 1993) (applying Van Gorkom to determine that the Technicolor
board had not made an "informed decision" in approving the sale of the company).
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derstood, the result in the case can be explained, not as a failure of the
board deliberative process, but as a failure by the board properly to monitor
the negotiations between the company and its putative acquirer.
Second, the opinion is useful because it illustrates the basic problem
with mandatory, immutable rules in the area of corporate governance. Be-
cause the court was crafting a one-size-fits-all standard of behavior, it was
forced to promulgate a rule that would serve both honest, highly qualified,
and experienced boards like Trans Union, and corrupt, unqualified, or inex-
perienced boards that constitute the real challenge for any system of corpo-
rate governance. Here this Article argued that the outcome in Smith v. Van
Gorkom appears questionable against the backdrop of the tremendous quali-
fications of that board. But the opinion would not appear to be so odd if the
court's admonishments about high deliberative standards, careful disclosure
to shareholders, and the use of qualified independent experts had been made
to a board that was of demonstrably low quality.
From this perspective, the court's decision stands as yet another argu-
ment in favor of having corporations governed by contractual rules that can
be altered to suit the individual, particularized needs of a particular firm, as
opposed to mandatory rules that are inviolable. This, of course, is more or
less what occurred in Delaware73 and throughout the nation74 after the Van
Gorkom opinion. Specifically, the vast majority of states revised their stat-
utes to permit firms to immunize directors from the threat of personal liabil-
ity in damages for breaching the fiduciary duty of care." The statutes can
be criticized on the grounds that pathological boards can adopt these statu-
tory provisions as easily as high quality boards. Thus, because virtually all
firms have taken advantage of the ability to implement exculpatory provi-
sions, the statutory response to Smith v. Van Gorkom can be viewed as
benefiting firms with good corporate governance at the expense of firms
with weak corporate governance, while the decision itself can be viewed as
benefiting firms with bad corporate governance at the expense of firms with
good corporate governance.
Finally, the opinion is interesting because it can teach us about corpo-
73 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
74 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REv. 477, 490
(2000). Hamermesh writes that "[a]fter Van Gorkom was decided in 1985, the overwhelming majority
of states followed Delaware's lead and adopted statutes that either (i) permit the articles or certificate of
incorporation to eliminate a director's personal liability in damages for breach of the duty of care, or (ii)
eliminate such liability directly." Id. In fact, Indiana was the first state to confer additional protections
on directors after Van Gorkom. Delaware followed two months later. See McChesney, supra note 3, at
649.
75 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4)
(1999) (eliminating personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duty of care). As of January 1999, 43
states had adopted statutes permitting firms to immunize directors from personal liability for duty-of-
care violations. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES: CASES & MATERIALS 783 (7th ed. 2001).
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rate federalism and the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters.
First and foremost, the case convincingly refutes the race-to-the-bottom
theory of jurisdictional competition, which posits that Delaware competes
for charters by promulgating rules that pander to management. As noted
above, there is no question that the opinion is hostile to management both in
tone and in result. As such, the antimanagement result should be the final
nail in the coffin of the race-to-the-bottom theory.
76
The opinion supports the interest group theory of jurisdictional compe-
tition for corporate charters espoused by Macey and Miller. After Van
Gorkom, advisors could have stopped recommending Delaware. But they
did not, because the opinion operates to their benefit. The decision requires
that boards follow an array of detailed and expensive procedures in order to
be assured of having the benefit of the business judgment rule. The opinion
has prompted lawyers to instruct their director clients to "hire expensive fi-
nancial advisers, commission extensive studies and otherwise improve their
paper record of their decisional process in order to reduce the risk of liabil-
ity in situations similar to Van Gorkom. 77 This result, therefore, will in-
crease the demand for the services of the lawyers and investment bankers
who guide the decision about where to incorporate.
76 The race-to-the-bottom theory already has been discredited. First, the available empirical evi-
dence shows that incorporating in Delaware is a welfare-enhancing move from the point of view of the
shareholders. Richard Dodd & Robert Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: 'Unhealthy Com-
petition' Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 59, 263 (1980). Second, if there really were a destruc-
tive race to the bottom, then Delaware, which leads the nation in the jurisdictional competition for
corporate charters, should have the most restrictive rules governing the market for corporate control.
But it does not. Winter, supra note 63, at 254-55; Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Char-
ters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 843, 858-59 (1993).
77 Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors, 24 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 5, 28 (1989).
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